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linux/lib
Mark Rutland bf90e56e46 lib: harden strncpy_from_user
The strncpy_from_user() accessor is effectively a copy_from_user()
specialised to copy strings, terminating early at a NUL byte if possible.
In other respects it is identical, and can be used to copy an arbitrarily
large buffer from userspace into the kernel.  Conceptually, it exposes a
similar attack surface.

As with copy_from_user(), we check the destination range when the kernel
is built with KASAN, but unlike copy_from_user() we do not check the
destination buffer when using HARDENED_USERCOPY.  As strncpy_from_user()
calls get_user() in a loop, we must call check_object_size() explicitly.

This patch adds this instrumentation to strncpy_from_user(), per the same
rationale as with the regular copy_from_user().  In the absence of
hardened usercopy this will have no impact as the instrumentation expands
to an empty static inline function.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472221903-31181-1-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-11 15:06:30 -07:00
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