When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/watchdog/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@iguana.be>
cc: Zwane Mwaikambo <zwanem@gmail.com>
cc: linux-watchdog@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/video/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com>
cc: Tomi Valkeinen <tomi.valkeinen@ti.com>
cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/tty/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/vme/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Martyn Welch <martyn@welchs.me.uk>
cc: Manohar Vanga <manohar.vanga@gmail.com>
cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/speakup/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: speakup@linux-speakup.org
cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/staging/media/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
cc: devel@driverdev.osuosl.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/scsi/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: "Juergen E. Fischer" <fischer@norbit.de>
cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
cc: Dario Ballabio <ballabio_dario@emc.com>
cc: Finn Thain <fthain@telegraphics.com.au>
cc: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
cc: Achim Leubner <achim_leubner@adaptec.com>
cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/pcmcia/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-pcmcia@lists.infradead.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/pci/hotplug/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
cc: Scott Murray <scott@spiteful.org>
cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/parport/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/wireless/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/wan/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: "Jan \"Yenya\" Kasprzak" <kas@fi.muni.cz>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/irda/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/hamradio/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Thomas Sailer <t.sailer@alumni.ethz.ch>
cc: Joerg Reuter <jreuter@yaina.de>
cc: linux-hams@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/ethernet/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/can/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com>
cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/arcnet/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Michael Grzeschik <m.grzeschik@pengutronix.de>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/net/appletalk/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/mmc/host/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Pierre Ossman <pierre@ossman.eu>
cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
cc: linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/misc/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/media/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
cc: mjpeg-users@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/isdn/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/input/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/iio/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: William Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
cc: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/i2c/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Acked-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
cc: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/gpio/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: William Breathitt Gray <vilhelm.gray@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
cc: Alexandre Courbot <gnurou@gmail.com>
cc: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/cpufreq/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/clocksource/.
[Note: With regard to cs5535-clockevt.c, Thomas Gleixner asked whether the
timer_irq parameter is required for the driver to work on anything other than
arbitrary hardware which has it mapped to 0. Jens Rottmann replied that the
parameter defaults to 0, which means:
1. autodetect (=keep IRQ BIOS has set up)
2. if that fails use CONFIG_CS5535_MFGPT_DEFAULT_IRQ
(see drivers/misc/cs5535-mfgpt.c: cs5535_mfgpt_set_irq())
Jens further noted that there may not be any systems that have CS5535/36
devices that support EFI and secure boot.]
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: Jens Rottmann <Jens.Rottmann@ADLINKtech.com>
cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/mwave/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in drivers/char/ipmi/.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
cc: openipmi-developer@lists.sourceforge.net
When the kernel is running in secure boot mode, we lock down the kernel to
prevent userspace from modifying the running kernel image. Whilst this
includes prohibiting access to things like /dev/mem, it must also prevent
access by means of configuring driver modules in such a way as to cause a
device to access or modify the kernel image.
To this end, annotate module_param* statements that refer to hardware
configuration and indicate for future reference what type of parameter they
specify. The parameter parser in the core sees this information and can
skip such parameters with an error message if the kernel is locked down.
The module initialisation then runs as normal, but just sees whatever the
default values for those parameters is.
Note that we do still need to do the module initialisation because some
drivers have viable defaults set in case parameters aren't specified and
some drivers support automatic configuration (e.g. PNP or PCI) in addition
to manually coded parameters.
This patch annotates drivers in arch/x86/mm/.
[Note: With respect to testmmiotrace, an additional patch will be added
separately that makes the module refuse to load if the kernel is locked
down.]
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
cc: nouveau@lists.freedesktop.org
Provided an annotation for module parameters that specify hardware
parameters (such as io ports, iomem addresses, irqs, dma channels, fixed
dma buffers and other types).
This will enable such parameters to be locked down in the core parameter
parser for secure boot support.
I've also included annotations as to what sort of hardware configuration
each module is dealing with for future use. Some of these are
straightforward (ioport, iomem, irq, dma), but there are also:
(1) drivers that switch the semantics of a parameter between ioport and
iomem depending on a second parameter,
(2) drivers that appear to reserve a CPU memory buffer at a fixed address,
(3) other parameters, such as bus types and irq selection bitmasks.
For the moment, the hardware configuration type isn't actually stored,
though its validity is checked.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Prepare to mark sensitive kernel structures for randomization by making
sure they're using designated initializers. These were identified during
allyesconfig builds of x86, arm, and arm64, with most initializer fixes
extracted from grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security
in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change.
TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct"
security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct
task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another
example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred
a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although
security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module
wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob,
security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were
not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules
which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob.
We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully
armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks
like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of
lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive
hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not
implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will
become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"->
security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length
"struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>
Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull char/misc driver fixes from Greg KH:
"A smattering of different small fixes for some random driver
subsystems. Nothing all that major, just resolutions for reported
issues and bugs.
All have been in linux-next with no reported issues"
* tag 'char-misc-4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (21 commits)
extcon: int3496: Set the id pin to direction-input if necessary
extcon: int3496: Use gpiod_get instead of gpiod_get_index
extcon: int3496: Add dependency on X86 as it's Intel specific
extcon: int3496: Add GPIO ACPI mapping table
extcon: int3496: Rename GPIO pins in accordance with binding
vmw_vmci: handle the return value from pci_alloc_irq_vectors correctly
ppdev: fix registering same device name
parport: fix attempt to write duplicate procfiles
auxdisplay: img-ascii-lcd: add missing sentinel entry in img_ascii_lcd_matches
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't leak memory when a channel is rescinded
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Don't leak channel ids
Drivers: hv: util: don't forget to init host_ts.lock
Drivers: hv: util: move waiting for release to hv_utils_transport itself
vmbus: remove hv_event_tasklet_disable/enable
vmbus: use rcu for per-cpu channel list
mei: don't wait for os version message reply
mei: fix deadlock on mei reset
intel_th: pci: Add Gemini Lake support
intel_th: pci: Add Denverton SOC support
intel_th: Don't leak module refcount on failure to activate
...
Pull driver core fix from Greg KH:
"Here is a single kernfs fix for 4.11-rc4 that resolves a reported
issue.
It has been in linux-next with no reported issues"
* tag 'driver-core-4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
kernfs: Check KERNFS_HAS_RELEASE before calling kernfs_release_file()
Pull tty/serial driver fixes from Greg KH:
"Here are some tty and serial driver fixes for 4.11-rc4.
One of these fix a long-standing issue in the ldisc code that was
found by Dmitry Vyukov with his great fuzzing work. The other fixes
resolve other reported issues, and there is one revert of a patch in
4.11-rc1 that wasn't correct.
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues"
* tag 'tty-4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty:
tty: fix data race in tty_ldisc_ref_wait()
tty: don't panic on OOM in tty_set_ldisc()
Revert "tty: serial: pl011: add ttyAMA for matching pl011 console"
tty: acpi/spcr: QDF2400 E44 checks for wrong OEM revision
serial: 8250_dw: Fix breakage when HAVE_CLK=n
serial: 8250_dw: Honor clk_round_rate errors in dw8250_set_termios
Pull IIO driver fixes from Greg KH:
"Here are some small IIO driver fixes for 4.11-rc4 that resolve a
number of tiny reported issues. All of these have been in linux-next
for a while with no reported issues"
* tag 'staging-4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/staging:
iio: imu: st_lsm6dsx: fix FIFO_CTRL2 overwrite during watermark configuration
iio: adc: ti_am335x_adc: fix fifo overrun recovery
iio: sw-device: Fix config group initialization
iio: magnetometer: ak8974: remove incorrect __exit markups
iio: hid-sensor-trigger: Change get poll value function order to avoid sensor properties losing after resume from S3
Pull USB/PHY fixes from Greg KH:
"Here are a number of small USB and PHY driver fixes for 4.11-rc4.
Nothing major here, just an bunch of small fixes, and a handfull of
good fixes from Johan for devices with crazy descriptors. There are a
few new device ids in here as well.
All of these have been in linux-next with no reported issues"
* tag 'usb-4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb: (26 commits)
usb: gadget: f_hid: fix: Don't access hidg->req without spinlock held
usb: gadget: udc: remove pointer dereference after free
usb: gadget: f_uvc: Sanity check wMaxPacketSize for SuperSpeed
usb: gadget: f_uvc: Fix SuperSpeed companion descriptor's wBytesPerInterval
usb: gadget: acm: fix endianness in notifications
usb: dwc3: gadget: delay unmap of bounced requests
USB: serial: qcserial: add Dell DW5811e
usb: hub: Fix crash after failure to read BOS descriptor
ACM gadget: fix endianness in notifications
USB: usbtmc: fix probe error path
USB: usbtmc: add missing endpoint sanity check
USB: serial: option: add Quectel UC15, UC20, EC21, and EC25 modems
usb: musb: fix possible spinlock deadlock
usb: musb: dsps: fix iounmap in error and exit paths
usb: musb: cppi41: don't check early-TX-interrupt for Isoch transfer
usb-core: Add LINEAR_FRAME_INTR_BINTERVAL USB quirk
uwb: i1480-dfu: fix NULL-deref at probe
uwb: hwa-rc: fix NULL-deref at probe
USB: wusbcore: fix NULL-deref at probe
USB: uss720: fix NULL-deref at probe
...
Pull more powerpc fixes from Michael Ellerman:
"These are all pretty minor. The fix for idle wakeup would be a bad bug
but has not been observed in practice.
The update to the gcc-plugins docs was Cc'ed to Kees and Jon, Kees
OK'ed it going via powerpc and I didn't hear from Jon.
- cxl: Route eeh events to all slices for pci_channel_io_perm_failure state
- powerpc/64s: Fix idle wakeup potential to clobber registers
- Revert "powerpc/64: Disable use of radix under a hypervisor"
- gcc-plugins: update architecture list in documentation
Thanks to: Andrew Donnellan, Nicholas Piggin, Paul Mackerras, Vaibhav
Jain"
* tag 'powerpc-4.11-6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
gcc-plugins: update architecture list in documentation
Revert "powerpc/64: Disable use of radix under a hypervisor"
powerpc/64s: Fix idle wakeup potential to clobber registers
cxl: Route eeh events to all slices for pci_channel_io_perm_failure state
Pull ext4 fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"Fix a memory leak on an error path, and two races when modifying
inodes relating to the inline_data and metadata checksum features"
* tag 'ext4_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
ext4: fix two spelling nits
ext4: lock the xattr block before checksuming it
jbd2: don't leak memory if setting up journal fails
ext4: mark inode dirty after converting inline directory
Pull fscrypto fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"A code cleanup and bugfix for fs/crypto"
* tag 'fscrypt-for-linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt:
fscrypt: eliminate ->prepare_context() operation
fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Pull hwmon fixes from Guenter Roeck:
- bug fixes in asus_atk0110, it87 and max31790 drivers
- added missing API definition to hwmon core
* tag 'hwmon-for-linus-v4.11-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/groeck/linux-staging:
hwmon: (asus_atk0110) fix uninitialized data access
hwmon: Add missing HWMON_T_ALARM
hwmon: (it87) Avoid registering the same chip on both SIO addresses
hwmon: (max31790) Set correct PWM value
Pull rdma fixes from Doug Ledford:
"This has been a slow -rc cycle for the RDMA subsystem. We really
haven't had a lot of rc fixes come in. This pull request is the first
of this entire rc cycle and it has all of the suitable fixes so far
and it's still only about 20 patches. The fix for the minor breakage
cause by the dma mapping patchset is in here, as well as a couple
other potential oops fixes, but the rest is more minor.
Summary:
- fix for dma_ops change in this kernel, resolving the s390, powerpc,
and IOMMU operation
- a few other oops fixes
- the rest are all minor fixes"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dledford/rdma:
IB/qib: fix false-postive maybe-uninitialized warning
RDMA/iser: Fix possible mr leak on device removal event
IB/device: Convert ib-comp-wq to be CPU-bound
IB/cq: Don't process more than the given budget
IB/rxe: increment msn only when completing a request
uapi: fix rdma/mlx5-abi.h userspace compilation errors
IB/core: Restore I/O MMU, s390 and powerpc support
IB/rxe: Update documentation link
RDMA/ocrdma: fix a type issue in ocrdma_put_pd_num()
IB/rxe: double free on error
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Activate device on ethernet link up
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Dont hardcode QP header page
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Cleanup unused variables
infiniband: Fix alignment of mmap cookies to support VIPT caching
IB/core: Protect against self-requeue of a cq work item
i40iw: Receive netdev events post INET_NOTIFIER state
Pull audit fix from Paul Moore:
"We've got an audit fix, and unfortunately it is big.
While I'm not excited that we need to be sending you something this
large during the -rcX phase, it does fix some very real, and very
tangled, problems relating to locking, backlog queues, and the audit
daemon connection.
This code has passed our testsuite without problem and it has held up
to my ad-hoc stress tests (arguably better than the existing code),
please consider pulling this as fix for the next v4.11-rcX tag"
* 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit:
audit: fix auditd/kernel connection state tracking
